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Marco Goldoni, Antwerp / Belgium
* 
 
The Normativity of Code as Law: Towards Input Legitimacy 
 
Abstract:  In  the  debate  on  how  the  new  information  and  communication  technologies  impact  on 
democratic politics the role played by the digital architecture seems to be surprisingly underrated. In 
particular, while a lot of attention has been paid to the possibilities that new technologies open up to 
democratic theory, few works have attempted to look at how democracy may help in shaping technologies.  
By adopting as a starting point the approach known as ‘code as law’, the paper aims at two objectives: to 
re-affirm the importance of discussing normative principles to guide the process of code writing in order 
to reinvigorate the debate; to claim the importance of input reasons when deciding which principles 
should be chosen. After having remarked that code is relevant for establishing democratic norms, the 
paper briefly tackles with the main attempts by European scholars to deal with this issue. Then, a couple 
of practical examples of how code impacts on democratic rights are sketched out. In the last section of the 
paper  a  shift  from  an  output-based  approach  to  the  legitimacy  of  code  to  an  input-based  is  openly 
advocated: an inquiry into the legitimacy of code should focus on its production. 
Keywords: Code as Law, Normative Principles, Electronic Democracy, Input Reasons  
 
I. The Importance of Code for Democratic Politics 
It is quite striking to remark, in the debate on electronic democracy, electronic government and 
more generally on democracy in the digital age, the relative little attention paid to the normative 
role played by the technological environment.
1 As if this aspect were taken as a given, a natural 
setting within which communication takes place, the role of architectural technology is rarely 
mentioned and explored in full depth in the research on democratic politics in the digital age.
2 To 
this assumption it must be added that electronic democracy is usually presented as an aspect of e-
government, as if governmental agencies may simply digitalize political initiatives that once were 
only possible in the ‘physical world’.
3 In this way, the setting of the technological environment is 
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usually not contested and the debate seems to take for granted a starting point that is everything 
but firm and stable.
4  
On the contrary, an analysis of how democracy works in a digital environment cannot 
exempt itself from undertaking a critique of the architecture within which political action takes 
place and of the (economic, legal and social) forces that shape it. The claim here is not that 
nobody has looked at how digital architecture is shaped, even though this aspect  has always 
represented a secondary interest at best. The debate has focused mainly on the contents which are 
passing through the digital environment and on how the Internet in particular affects democratic 
life.
5 But few scholars have taken up the question of which kind of normative principles ought to 
be taken as yardstick against which judging specific codes. More precisely, it is important to look 
not only at how new technologies shape democratic politics, but also how democratic action can 
shape the same technologies. This topic becomes even more salient if one bears in mind that 
regulation embedded in technology, even if adopted in the most transparent way, tends to become 
blurred with the passing of time and no longer recognized for what it once was: a normative rule 
that intentionally impacts upon people’s behaviour. As it will be explained below, default settings 
seem to have a legitimating effect because apparently the default is ‘normal’ to the eyes of the 
users.
6 
This apparent scarcity of reflection, more visible in the European debate, looks even more 
striking when one bears in mind that during the second half of the Nineties, a generation of 
cyber-scholars established the approach known as ‘Code as Law’ as the main point of reference. 
Briefly, the main contention was that contrary to the idea that the Internet is beyond the reach of 
regulation,  as  believed  by  the  first  generation  of  digital  libertarian  scholars
7  cyberspace had 
begun to develop its own control mechanisms in the form of code (as dis tinct from traditional 
mechanisms tied to the State). In this context, software and hardware tend to regulate themselves. 
This interpretation has culminated in the bold claim that  –  somehow  –  ‘code  is  law’.  The 
recognition of the importance of code in regulating new technologies was mainly due to the 
seminal works, among others, of Lawrence Lessig
8 and Joel Reidenberg.
9 Faced with the problem 
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of  how  to  regulate  cyberspace,  and  more  generally  the  networks  of  global  connection,  legal 
scholars  were  convinced  that  the  best  solution  could  be  internal  and  not  external  to  the 
technology adopted. As a consequence of that, a dispute ensued about the real novelty brought by 
ICT law, and in particular by Internet law, which was well captured by the debate between the 
American judge Frank Easterbrook
10 and Lessig,
11 with the reference to the so-called “Law of the 
Horse”.
12 In other terms, Lessig and Reidenberg, contra Easterbrook, remarked that the best way 
to  cope  with  the  problem  of  a  powerful  technology  was  to  use  the  same  means  as  a 
counterbalance. If code could be used to intentionally regulate human behaviour, then why not 
using it for good purposes? Of course, as Lessig argued, the recognition of this state of affairs 
posed a specific normative problem: “if code is a lawmaker, then it should embrace the values of 
a particular kind of lawmaking”.
13 The idea that code is ‘really’ law is still a divisive one, and it 
should be noted, a growingly controversial one, up to the point where an influential commentator 
can remark that code is all about ‘interest group behaviour’, that is to say, code is designed as an 
alternative to lobbying.
14 Probably, this mild but increasing skepticism on the regulatory force of 
code has partially hampered the flourishing of a debate on the norm ative criteria for assessing 
code as a lawmaking procedure, which still remains rather underdeveloped.
15 Yet, even those 
who contest the idea that code is literally like law still recognize its regulatory impact, as, for 
example, a cautious author like Wagn er does: “that technology has regulatory impact does not 
suggest  that  it  is  directly  interchangeable  with  law,  and  it  is  easy  to  understand  how  the 
regulatory mechanisms differ”.
16 This paper tries to deal with the normative implications of this 
regulatory power by analyzing the few works which have explored this question. In order to show 
the  limits  that  a  partially  unaware  acceptance  of  code  as  a  quasi-natural  given  imposes  on 
democratic rights, some problems concerning freedom of speech and filtering on the Internet will 
be outlined. The importance of introducing normative principles for regulating code does not 
commit to the view that “code-based change at various levels of the Internet architecture has 
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emerged as potentially the most powerful  regulatory  strategy available”.
17 Nonetheless, these 
examples should strengthen the opportunity of reflecting on the normative criteria which should 
guide our judgments on code. 
Finally, in the last section, given the attention paid by the relevant literature on outcome 
reasons, this paper argues that it is appropriate to put more emphasis on input and procedural 
reasons. The way code is shaped, and how users and activists can intervene on it and on the 
content that through it is shaped and distributed, should be seen as extremely relevant from a 
normative point of view. This will not make all the (ethical and legal) issues that developers and 
Internet users have to face quickly fade away, but it may help in re-orientating the current trend 
from normative arguments based on distribution to the centrality of production. 
But before moving on, it is necessary to introduce a couple of clarifications. First, by code, 
this paper denotes software and part of the hardware that function as a set of normative rules. 
This normative function is common to technology understood in its widest sense, but since the 
focus  here  is  on  information  and  communication  technologies,  code  appears  to  be  a  more 
accurate term.
18 Moreover, following a division presented by, among others, Yochai Benkler ,
19 
code comprises some of the layers that constitute the Internet. More specifically, he distinguishes 
among three layers: Content, Code, and Physical. The content layer comprises: speech, text, 
images, movies and every other content made available and dis seminated on the Internet by its 
users. This content is transmitted over an infrastructure of computers and the wires that link them 
together. This is the physical layer. In the middle of these two layers there is the code layer. It 
consists of the different protocols that form its core architecture and the software upon which 
they run.  
Second, code as law will be understood in its most inclusive way. In this context, a  lato 
sensu reading of code implies to take into account the following two dimensions: on the one side, 
code can be a norm-enforcing technology, as it has been outlined several times in the debate; on 
the other side, code can be also a norm-establishing technology as well. The recognition of these 
two aspects of code makes a reflection on normative principles extremely relevant. 
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II. Code and Rules 
For a legal theorist, one of the most interesting aspects of code is the intentional feature of its 
regulatory impact. This makes it somehow close to certain features of the law as understood in 
the classic positivist tradition from Austin to Kelsen, even though code cannot be equated to a 
command  backed  with  sanction.  Nonetheless,  architectural  regulation  raises  normative  issues 
because of some of its operational aspects. We should not forget that code sets certain features 
which  represent  the  framework  within  which  action  takes  place:  most  importantly,  they  are 
features  selected  by  code  writers;  they  constrain  some  behaviour  (for  example,  electronic 
eavesdropping) by making other behavior possible (for example, encryption). They embed certain 
values,  or  on  the  other  side  they  exclude  them.
20  Under  certain  aspects,  code  works  as 
constitutive rules do.
21  
Besides, code is being used more and more as law for regulating human behaviour. Both 
Lessig and Reidenberg have provided examples of how rules are embedded in code. Reidenberg, 
in particular, made it clear that choice of design in systems impose rules on participants: the 
creation  and  implementation  of  information  policy  are  embedded  in  network  designs  and 
standards as well as in system configurations. Traditi onal rule-making appears to be extremely 
different from architectural regulation: “in the context of information flows on networks, the 
technical solutions begin to illustrate that network technology itself imposes rules for the access 
to and use of information”.
22 Other authors have stated clearly in which sense code is made of 
rules: 
 
 in terms of optimal lawmaking analysis, technological standards are closely related to legal rules. For 
example, both substantive rules and technological standards influence user behaviour directly. As 
technological standards’ influence on behaviour increases, they will increase in similarity to legal 
rules.  Rules  are  best  promulgated  by  centralized  institutions,  particularly  public,  governmental 
institutions … Moreover, the task of formal political institutions should be to confirm the legitimacy 
of choices made by de facto standard setters by ensuring that all interested parties are involved and by 
exercising an appropriate control structure over decentralized standard setting.
23  
 
To cut a long story short, code as law is normative in the sense that it regulates and guides human 
behaviour. This is the specific aspect of code as law with which this paper deals.  
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As reminded by Ludwig Asscher,
24 there are several cases where code is used for self -
regulation. First, code is used to enable the enforcement of rights. Code is a potentially perfect 
tool of enforcement. If technology completely prevents one from copying a book, a copyright 
infringement becomes very difficult. Second, if technology blocks the access to certain prohibited 
information, the distribution of that information has been stopped much more efficiently than if a 
judge would have declared that piece of information to be unlawful. Co de can also be used as a 
tool for self-regulation. Architectural regulation shapes the relationship between private parties 
with no need for government to step in. Finally, code may in different ways be replacing the 
traditional balancing of interests: if  code is replacing the role of a judge when considering 
limitations to a particular right, then it is replacing the enforcement of that right. 
A key difference between code and law, however, pertains to the kind of rules that belong to 
these  two  regulative  tools.  To  take  into  account  this  difference  may  caution  against  an 
enthusiastic embrace of this modality of regulation because while legal norms determine how 
people should behave, leaving them the possibility to chose whether to comply or not, code, 
particularly in its norm-establishing version, determines how people can behave. By remarking 
that code is an efficient means of regulation, Lessig also noted that its perfection can make it into 
something more controversial: “One obeys these laws as code not because one should; one obeys 
these laws as code because one can do nothing else. There is no choice about whether to yield to 
the demand for a password: one complies if one wants to enter the system”.
25 In a nutshell: 
Compared to legal norms, code can become a much more pervasive, yet not always visible, mean 
of control. The case of privacy is quite telling of how code has already upset the traditional 
regulatory balance by threatening the protection of this value beyond the control of courts and 
parliaments.
26  
Often the very features of code that make it a viable (and attractive) alternative to legal 
regulation can have troubling effects, at least as compared to legal regulation. From a democratic 
point of view, the public dimension of lawmaking is deemed to  be valuable and necessary. In a 
recent essay, Jeremy Waldron has proposed an attractive definition of this aspect of lawmaking in 
terms of “the way law presents itself as a body of rules dealing with matters that are appropriately 
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matters of public concern and dealing with them in a way that can stand in the name of public”.
27 
If the public aspect of lawmaking is recognised and taken into account, then the role of code 
writing needs to be put under a different light. Of course, one may object that legal rules not 
always are clear and that lawmaking procedures often take place behind curtains, in the realm of 
lobbying and interest bargaining. However, most of the times, the outcome is public and visible, 
and even though not all citizens may be aware of the existence of a legal rule, they may easily 
retrieve it.
28 Rules also need some minimal level of enforcement and this is normally a human 
and complex activity. Non-compliance with rules, in order to be meaningful, must be detectable 
by the appropriate agency.  The actors involved in this operation usually possess discretion and 
exercise judgment on their reasons for action. This is part and parcel of the social organization of 
the law and public processes of enforcement are instrumental to it.
29  
Code functions in another way. As famously argued by Walter Benjamin about the fruition 
of  architecture  (for  whom  buildings  are  appropriated  in  a  twofold  manner:  “by  use  and  by 
perception”),
30 people simply find themselves in an architectural environment. The element of 
consent or choice tends to disappear within code. One cannot often say that one chooses to obey 
to the rules of code. One of the most recurrent discussions in legal theory is about the question of 
whether there is or ought to be an obligation to obey the law, and which kind of aspect of the law 
(its  content or its  sources) makes  legitimate its authority.
31  In fact, code may not leave any 
possibility of choice. Once entered into the architecture, an agent cannot choose whether to obey 
a rule or not. Besides, code can provide for perfect enforcement, leaving no room for breaking (or 
disobeying) a normative rule. Finally, rules established by code have often a blurred pedigree and 
from the enforcement perspective, architectural regulation bypasses many of the poss ibilities for 
human actors to modulate the effects or meaning of a rule in the enforcement process, which is, 
instead, delegated to technological settings. To these considerations, it must be added that even 
the rules and the institutions which govern the  Internet are not immune from the same kind of 
criticism.  For  example,  the  development  of  Internet  Corporation  for  Assigned  Names  and 
Numbers (ICANN) has been subject to severe criticism, both of its institutional design and its 
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(2003), 8-10. 
29 Ibid. 10. 
30 Quoted by Neil Katyal, Architecture as Crime Control, Yale Law Journal 111 (2002), 1072. 
31 For opposite takes on this issue see Joseph Raz, The Authority of Law (1979), Oxford, 2009; John Finnis, Natural 
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actual  workings.
32  These  considerations  stress  the  lack  of  any  public  process  over  norm -
establishing and norm-enforcing through code. These controversial aspects also remind of the 
need of looking for normative criteria for assessing code as law. 
Even though these features of code as lawmaker are recognized by scholars, a certain initial 
enthusiasm was common among many of them for what concerns the capacity of code to shape 
the environment. Digital libertarians, in particular, firmly believed in the impossibility and 
undesirability of traditional law to shape code. This initial interest in the emancipatory force of 
code seems to have left the place to a more  alarming and critical analysis.  Once certain 
problematic features of code are taken into account, the demands for normative principles cannot 
be eluded any longer.  
 
III. The Narrative of Code as Law: From a Descriptive to a Normative Approach 
With  the  exception  of  those  who  did  not  believe  the  Internet  would  represent  anything 
substantially new, a lot has been written about the liberating virtues of code as law, in particular 
against a formal legal positivist approach and a State-based understanding of the sources of law. 
Legal pluralists, for example, have seen in the raise of code an enriching factor for the legal 
world  and  an  increase  in  freedom.
33  Bypassing  the  State  as  the  centralized  machine  for 
lawmaking looked as a great chance to consolidate and augment individual freedom to their eyes. 
Yet, in the last ten years a growing skepticism can be detected and this repres ents another 
important factor in favour of adopting normative criteria. 
As noted, the first pioneering cyberlaw authors did not pay too much attention to the 
normative dimension of code. According to Lessig, the most prominent among these authors, 
regulating new technologies is a difficult task, which demands to look at a multiplicity of 
modalities. For him, the key is to balance among the different types of regulatory modes. Which 
are these potential regulatory modes? Lessig lists four:
34 the law, the market, social norms and the 
architecture (or code). There is no regulation in general, but only specific modes of regulation 
and each constrains differently: the legal, the economic, the social and the technological modes, 
which  are  respectively  denominated  as   law,  norms,  market,  and  architecture.  For  Lessig, 
regulating new technologies implies a right and balanced mix among these four factors. This is 
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what Lessig calls “the optimal mix”. A good illustrative example of how a mix may work is 
provided by Lessig himself by explaining the regulation of seat belts:  
 
The government may want citizens to wear seatbelts more often. It could pass a law to require the 
wearing of seatbelts (law regulating behavior directly). Or it could fund public education campaigns 
to create a stigma against those who do not wear seatbelts (law regulating social norms as a means to 
regulating behaviours). Or it could subsidize insurance companies to offer reduced rates to seatbelt 
wearers (law regulating the market as a way of regulating behaviour). Finally, the law could mandate 
automatic seatbelts, or ignition-locking systems (changing the code of the automobile as a means of 
regulating belting behaviour). Each action might be said to have some effect on seatbelt use: each has 
some cost. The question for the government is how to get the most seatbelt use of the least cost.
35  
 
Overall, the optimality requirement depends and varies according to its object.  
Lessig’s suggestion is “that we have to understand how the different modalities regulate and 
how they are subject, in an important sense, to law, then we will see how liberty is constructed 
not simply through the limits we place on law. Rather, liberty is constructed by structures that 
preserve a space for individual choice, however that choice may be constrained”.
36 From this 
point of view, law becomes a meta-regulator, which means, in this case, that it adjudicates how 
other regulatory means have to be employed. 
Yet,  Lessig  does  not  treat  the  question  of  which  normative  principles  should  guide  the 
regulatory activity, with the exception of some passages and a reference to the importance of 
individual choice, here understood as the possibility of leaving open certain options in the digital 
architecture to the user. This lack of reflection comes at a price. In fact, as Lessig himself points 
out, indirect control can be used astutely by the government, and one must add, also by private 
actors. The example of access to the public beaches on Long Island is a good one. If regulators 
declare  openly  and  directly  that  African  Americans  are  not  allowed  to  use  the  beaches,  the 
regulatory position and its objectives are perfectly visible and transparent. If, instead, regulators 
pursue the same objective indirectly by constructing narrow bridges or the like, then it might be 
much less clear what is going on and it would become more difficult to have a public debate (and 
possibly a conflict) on the issue.
37  
Joel Reidenberg’s move from a descriptive to a more critical stance towards code is quite 
indicative of a change of perspective in the literature on code as law. In his influential article on 
‘Lex Informatica’ (shaped after the Lex Mercatoria), he did take a neutral stance toward the 
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36 Ibid., 345. 
37 Lessig (note 11), 541-543. 10 
possible conflict between institutional law and code as law (lex informatica, indeed). He simply 
remarked how lex informatica could provide several effective tools for legal regulation. He, like 
Lessig, has not systematically articulated criteria for the acceptability of  lex informatica, but 
some of them can be inferred from his work. In fact, during the last decade, Reidenberg has 
moved  toward  an  increasingly  cautious  perspective  on  lex  informatica  and  he  has  started  to 
advocate a more active role for traditional law. For this reason, he tends to stress the importance 
of  political  control:  “because  technical  designs  and  choices  are  made  by  technologists, 
government policymakers should play an important role as public policy advocates promoting 
policy objectives”.
38 Reidenberg provides two criteria that should guide the regulation of code: 
legal authority and proportionality. For what concerns the first, “as a threshold matter, states must 
have a legal process in place to authorize the use and choice of technological enforcement tools’, 
while for the second, he believes that ‘the basic principle … should be that a state only use the 
least intrusive means to accomplish the rule enforcement”.
39 In the balance, the second principle 
seems to give to lex informatica a major role in the realm of regulation. 
While many American scholars seemed to have identified in the emergence of code a huge 
potential for more freedom and creativity,
40 Europeans have adopted from the very beginning a 
much  more  cautious  approach.  Here,  we  will  mention  three  European  authors  –  to  our 
knowledge, the only ones
41 – who have tried to propose normative criteria for evaluating code as 
law. 
The first one is also the most cautious. Roger Brownsword, in his discussion of ‘techno-
regulation’ (his term for architectural regulation) accepts Lessig’s classification of the regulatory 
modalities, but believes that there is an unavoidable conflict between the modalities coming from 
the law and the society (East Coast code) and the technological forces of code (what he calls 
West Coast code) because of the pressure coming from the latter to self-regulate themselves. By 
                                                           
38 Reidenberg (note 9), 580. 
39 Joel Reidenberg, States and Internet Enforcement, University of Ottawa Law & Technology Journal 1 (2004), 229. 
40 This attitude has been aptly summed up by James Boyle, Foucault in Cyberspace: Surveillance, Sovereignty and 
Hardwired Censors, University of Cincinnati Law Review 66 (1997), 205: “The attraction of technical solutions is 
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41 It is worth mentioning the work of Luciano Floridi on information ethics, even though his proposal is based on 
philosophy of information and does not put moral agency at its centre. Therefore, his moral principles concern 
mainly entropy: “entropy ought not to be caused in the infosphere (null law); 1) Entropy ought to be prevented in the 
infosphere; 2) Entropy ought to be removed from the infosphere; 3) Information welfare ought to be promoted by 
extending (information quantity), improving (information quality), and enriching (information variety) the 
infosphere”: Luciano Floridi, Information Ethics: On the Philosophical Foundation of Computer Ethics, Ethics and 
Information Technology 1 (1999), 47. 11 
presenting  the  issue  in  this  way,  Brownsword  has  already  paved  the  way  to  the  primacy  of 
institutional law. He basically proposes two criteria for regulatory intervention: effectiveness and 
legitimacy. The latter seems to be equal to respect of human rights and human dignity. More 
precisely, he seems to regard human rights and human dignity as co-essential. Or, to put it in a 
concise way, he considers human dignity as empowerment (as opposed to dignity as a constraint) 
to be realized through human rights. A critical consequence of this view of the centrality of 
human rights is that human beings should have a choice: the autonomy that underpins human 
rights “implies the provision of a context offering more rather than fewer options”.
42 The point of 
Brownsword’s critique of code as law lies here: it is constitutive of human dignity not only that 
right choices are made, but also that wrong choices can be made. As a result, Brownsword’s key 
criterion for assessing compliance-proof architectural regulation is freedom of choice.
43 
Bert-Jaap Koops has produced one of the most articulated lists of normative criteria, at least 
compared to other attempts at formulating criteria for archite ctural regulation. He distinguishes 
between primary and secondary criteria and establishes a hierarchy between them. Primary 
criteria are mostly substantial and they include human rights (clearly the most important factor in 
his view), other moral values that a society considers relevant (e.g., autonomy, dignity), and some 
procedural  values,  like  democratic  decision -making  and  inclusive  participation.  Secondary 
criteria  include  transparency,  accountability,  and  output  criteria  of  the  likes  of  efficiency, 
flexibility, context-adaptability.
44 To sum up Koops’ position, primary criteria should be met 
before the secondary criteria come into view. Among primary criteria,  substantial  ones  shall 
prevail over procedural ones. Of course, given the rather abstract and broad criteria advanced by 
Koops, assessments cannot yield a categorical answer of the kind yes or no, but only a degree-
based answer of the kind ‘more-or-less’. Be that as it may, the hierarchical order does provide a 
bottom-line: if core principles are met only to a low extent, then the overall assessment must be 
negative. In the balance, Koops seem to believe that what counts as primary is the output of code 
writing. As is the case for Brownsword, Koops adopts a primarily output-oriented approach, 
where the respect of human rights becomes the key parameter of evaluation. The difference is 
that according to Koops the scope of the technology in question and of its jurisdiction are also 
key elements to be taken into account for assessing the acceptability (this is the word that he 
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employs) of a code. If one does not know what the scope of a particular technology is, it is not 
possible to establish whether the application of that same technology is acceptable in a particular 
jurisdiction. 
Finally, another systematic attempt to offer a set of criteria to assess code has been made by 
Lodewijk Asscher. After having established that the rules embedded in code cannot be compared 
to legal rules, he discards positivism as an inapt normative legal theory for code as law and he 
suggests turning the attention to Lon Fuller’s criteria for the legitimacy of law (and to the criteria 
for freedom of expression sketched out by the European Court of Human Rights). This move 
leads to a series of questions that, according to him, should guide any assessment of code as law: 
“1. Can rules be distinguished in the code? 2. Are these rules accessible to the public? 3. Can 
these rules be reliable, in the sense that they are predictable? 4. Is there an authority that makes 
the code rules? 5. Is there a choice? Can the citizen choose not to obey the rules? Can they 
choose another system of code?”.
45 Once again, here we see a mix of input (question number 4) 
and output criteria, but even though the reference to Fuller’s inner morality may bring to think at 
a primarily output-based approach, Asscher reminds us of the importance of democratizing some 
of the most crucial code writing.
46 This is indeed one of the few remarks in the literature whose 
attention goes to the  normative  relevance  of  the  production  of  code.  But  before  proceeding 
further into this aspect of the legitimacy of code as law, it is necessary to take a brief detour in 
order to show how particular kinds of code-writing processes impact on certain democratic rights. 
 
IV. Two Examples: Freedom of Speech and Filtering 
Freedom  of  information  and  freedom  of  speech  are  fundamental  rights  for  any  theory  of 
democracy. And it is undeniable that architectural regulation influences the flow of information 
in society. Control of content can be achieved through the regulation of any of the three layers we 
made reference to in the first section. As remarked by Larry Solum and Chung, efforts to control 
speech are often realized through regulation in the lower layers of the network system (Code and 
physical layers, more than content). A discrepancy occurs between the places where targeted 
speech is conducted and where it is countered. As control is taken from the ends and moved into 
the architecture, a conflict arises with the notorious end-to-end argument and the principle of 
                                                           
45 Asscher (note 24), 85. 
46 Ibid., 88. 13 
layer separation.
47 Regulation of content at the physical layer can lead to a conspicuous blockade 
of speech (geographically bounded); regulation at the code network layer may block speech from 
a certain host machine (IP filtering); regulation at the code application layer (URL filtering) is 
limited to the speech contained in a certain document.
48 Regulation (and control) of information 
can take place both at the ends of the network or at its  ins  (source  and  destination  ISPs). 
Information control by service providers may prove to be more feasible than going after a wide 
variety of individual users. The provider is a node in the Internet chain where the enforcement of 
law and code regulation can be facilitated in a relative easy way. An ISP may function as a link 
between the user and the Internet, that is, as a vehicle for packets of data. An ISP may also host 
its own or other people’s content on its server. In both cases, it is possible to limit the flow of 
information through institutional law (think, for example, at the liability regime) and, crucially 
for the topic of this paper, through code.
49 
Another relevant example of the importance of code for freedom of information that is 
exercised at the users’ end level is represented by the case of filtering. Control of information 
from the side of the data flow has been mainly achieved by filtering technologies. This is a 
technique which may also deeply affect freedom of speech, yet the way it is put into practice 
through the regulation of the Internet puts certain values of good governance like legitimacy and 
accountability at risk, without letting users to be aware of how and when they are controlled. 
Geolocation  techniques  offer  geographic  localization  by  connecting  IP  addresses  to  the 
nationality of a user. This kind of technology facilitates, for example, the adjustment of language 
per region. But it also supports more personal advertising and the enforcement of local law. The 
blocking  of  region  specific  IP  addresses  at  the  network  layer  could  prevent  the  access  to 
sources.
50  Efforts at streaming the information flow on the basis of localities have not been 
limited to lawsuits. Google’s search engine represents the most known example of a practice of 
filtering based on a more informal approach. For example, in March 2001 Google removed the 
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links to web pages that contained material that allegedly infringed the copyright of the church of 
Scientology.
51 
As regards legitimacy, the use of technology to exert control over Internet users frequently 
challenges tenets associated with the rule of law, concerning both the process for (and content of) 
norms governing behaviour. These challenges emerge, in particul ar, where technology is linked 
to compliance with voluntary codes or soft law instruments by non-state actors. Whilst it may be 
suggested that the voluntary character of compliance with such instruments reduces or removes 
the requirements suggested by the rule of law, the consequences of compliance will often accrue 
to third parties who do not experience compliance as voluntary and in situations where many of 
the elements of the regime of control are determined by non -state actors outside of the normal 
public policy process. The combination of automatic enforcement, opaque systems and rules 
directed  at  intermediaries  may  leave  affected  users  unaware  that  their  behaviour  is  being 
controlled, so that the opaque nature of filtering may result in a loss of accountability. Where it is 
not clear what is being blocked, why, or by whom, the operation of mechanisms of accountability 
– for example: judicial review – is greatly reduced. 
 
V. Input Criteria for Legitimacy 
It is time to take stock and, in light of the previous considerations, to take up the question of the 
normative criteria to be applied in order to assess the legitimacy of code as law. This is done with 
the aim of reinvigorating a debate on this critical topic. 
As  a  framework  for  evaluating  the  legitimacy  of  code  one  can  refer  to  the  distinction 
between input and output reasons.
52 Input reasons are those reasons that apply to the procedural 
aspects of decisions, that is, to how a decision is reached. As a measure for legitimacy, input 
reasons take into account the fairness of the adopted procedure. Output reasons concern the 
content  of  decisions  and  they  represent  a  moral  yardstick  for  judging  the  legitimacy  of 
technologies. What counts as legitimate, according to the output -based perspective, is the end 
result of a decision and its normative content, not how the decision was reached. 
Those who have tried to put forward normative criteria for assessing code as law have 
mainly put the accent on output reasons, with human rights obviously playing a major role.  As 
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noted above, Brownsword has stressed the importance of respecting human rights and human 
dignity for judging the legitimacy of code as law.
53 Koops has affirmed that the best methodology 
for  the  acceptability  of  what  he  calls  ‘normative  technology’,  “does  not  lay  [in]  procedural 
justice, in which the criteria would be valid because the right procedure was followed to find 
them,  but  rather  to  outcome  justice,  in  which  the  criteria  are  valid  because  the  outcome  is 
accepted by the reader as a reasonable one”.
54 In a rather typical legalistic and formalist fashion, 
Koops would also have lawyers testing the set of criteria for normative technology. This sounds 
as a call for a debate among specialists, in order to build a firmer and more accurate set of 
criteria. If one takes for granted that lawyers are bearers of a culture of respect for human rights, 
and in particular for the right to privacy and freedom of speech, then the active involvement of 
the legal community may make the writing of code more sensitive to these values. Nonetheless, it 
is far from clear whether this is more than a necessary (but not sufficient) condition to have fair 
normative criteria respected in the production of code. 
Given the nature and the logic of architectural regulation, the emphasis on output legitimacy 
is  misplaced  for  several  reasons.  First,  since  technology  is  often  irreversible  –  once  it  is 
developed and applied in society, it is difficult to change it or remove it from society in those 
applications – the process which develops code as law becomes a key concern when normativity 
is at stake. In fact, it may well be too late when a particular version of a technology appears or is 
adopted in a given society to ask whether it is acceptable to keep a certain technology. The 
difficulty of reversing embedded code is often evident and makes it fundamental to focus on the 
procedure  and  the  actors  involved  in  the  development  of  the  technology.  Second,  given  the 
opacity  of  architectural  regulation,  to  be  aware  of  how  technology  is  directly  or  indirectly 
impacting upon agents’ behaviours may prove to be too difficult in many cases. Last but not 
least,  as  mentioned  in  the  first  section,  the  importance  of  default  technology  cannot  be 
underestimated. What appears to be default code is often taken as a natural and immutable fact. 
Of course, default settings entail choice. Nonetheless, the regulatory target of code need not be 
aware that there has been a decision to constrain or control his actions. On top of that, it is known 
that users often follow default settings even when they are against their best interest. This is 
usually explained by making reference to two factors. People do not change defaults because they 
are uninformed. A default setting is  essentially useless if a person does not know about the 
                                                           
53 Bronwnsword (note 42), 210. 
54 Koops (note 44), 167. 16 
possibility of changing the option or the ramification of each choice.
55 The second reason why 
people do not change their setting defaults is because of their lack of technical knowledge. If 
people cannot figure out how to change settings, they cannot modify it by definition.
56  
For these reasons, input-based legitimacy should become the primary concern in choosing 
normative criteria. But which kind of input reasons is to be placed at the center of the evaluation 
of the design process? Given that code is not exactly like law, it is difficult in the realm of code to 
adopt a kind  of rule of law (or ‘rule of code’) approach. Yet, we have also seen that when a 
particular code is ‘enacted’, it may be too late to remedy to the violation of certain rights. This is 
why  the  accent  should  be  put  on  the  moment  of  production,  rather  than  on  the  moment  of 
distribution.  The  moment  of  production  should  be  assessed  according  to  two  intertwined 
principles: one is transparency and publicness. Decisions, in order to be accountable, should be 
known and also the procedure that brought to that decision should be disclosed. The second 
principle that should guide the ‘writing’ of code is equal chance of participation to the process, 
which also entails the idea that the writing process should be as inclusive as possible. 
The predictable example of an inclusive and egalitarian participation in the definition of 
code  is  the  case  of  F/OSS  (Free/Open  Source  Software)  communities,  which  are  considered 
important  agents  of  democratic  participation.  Clearly,  F/OSS  communities  should  not  be 
romanticized, otherwise one runs the risk of falling into the trap of technological utopianism. For 
example, the issues of ‘forking’ and the disagreement between free software advocates and open 
source  developers  remind  us  that  the  F/OSS  communities  are  everything  but  a  monolithic 
universe.
57 But the study of these communities reveals that issues of democratic production of 
code are still central and when approached in an inclusive and open way, it turns out to be also 
the most fruitful one.
58 At this stage, the argument advanced by  Jack Balkin in support of a 
democratic digital culture should clearly resonate here:  
 
a ‘democratic’ culture … means much more than democracy as a form of self-governance. It means 
democracy as a form of social life in which unjust barriers of rank and privilege are dissolved, and in 
which ordinary people gain a greater say over the institutions and practices that shape them and their 
futures.  What  makes  a  culture  democratic,  then,  is  not  democratic  governance,  but  democratic 
participation.
59    
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It is time to shift again the discourse from distribution to production and focus on how the 
digital environment is created. The closest analogy to what is proposed in this paper is to the way 
commons  can be  governed,
60 in terms of non-hierarchical participation to its  production and 
preservation.
61 
Finally, two cautionary notes concerning the assessment methodology are in order. First, 
there is always a gap between a norm promulgated by the legitimate public authority and its 
translation into a technology. In other words, there is always a difference between ‘law in books’ 
and ‘law in technology’.
62 In the translation process, choices and reductions take place, and these 
may not be necessarily made in the most inclusive way by technology developers. Second, the 
scope of normative criteria cannot be constrained to public institutions. These criteria should also 
become relevant for technology that is developed where private parties build in norms in order to 
influence users’ behaviour. Code is not only the longa manus of official law, but can also be an 
instrument of power of the market or of civil society.
63 In light of the emergence during the last 
decades of de-regulation as a landmark of policy in the private sphere, it is even more urgent to 
extend the normative criteria (and possibly constitutional safeguards) to the private development 
of architectural regulation. Moreover, the growth of polycentric governance, where multiple 
layers  of  supranational,  national  and  local  institutions  are  combined  with  non  state -actors 
regulation, makes any sharp distinction between public and private regulation hard to maintain. 
One can think at cases where the relevance of private regulation is manifest, like, for example, a 
case of a search engine filtering information that concerns the same company that runs the search 
engine, or worse, information that shed a bad light on the political forces which are supported by 
this company. Nonetheless, not every private regulation has to be subjected to the same scrutiny: 
it will depend on the context. 
This last remark brings us to a final consideration. It is quite hard to judge architectural 
regulation from a general and purely universal perspective. To evaluate the acceptability of 
architectural regulation as such is extremely complex and it s eems not to take into account the 
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great variety in codes that nowadays has become apparent. Furthermore, the assessment of code 
may  vary  according  to  the  modification  of  the  technology  itself,  which  impacts  upon  the 
interpretation of the criteria overtime. Code may go through several stages and judgments on its 
legitimacy passed at a certain time may differ radically from the conclusions drawn previously at 
a  later  moment.  This  means,  in  other  words,  that  it  is  not  promising  (actually,  it  may  look 
Sisyphean) to ask in abstract whether a privacy-friendly identity-management system is a good 
code. It is also important to determine what are the persons most affected by the code and to 
establish who might have a say in the design process, which means, moreover, that normative 
criteria are necessary also in order to identify the relevant groups. Therefore, it is unavoidable to 
focus on the specific code one wants to assess and to address the affected communities. Context-
sensitivity is essential in this case; the application of the normative criteria outlined above implies 
the interpretation and the weighing of the input-based principles in the concrete instance. This is 
a challenge and an invitation to develop further and in a more detailed way the normative criteria 
we want to adopt for a more inclusive and transparent architectural regulation.  
The necessity of dealing with this question will become even more urgent because of the 
emergence  of  new  technologies.  As  aptly  remarked  by  Mireille  Hildebrandt  and  Bert-Jaap 
Koops,
64 ambient-intelligence technologies will represent another challenge for the discourse on 
the legitimacy of ICT media. Ambient intelligence is a kind of technology made of smart 
environments that continuously make instantaneous decisions on citiz ens and consumers based 
on profiles and large collection of personal data. In such an environment, legal norms for the 
protection and enhancement of the privacy and equality of citizens will be inadequate. ‘Ambient 
law’ will be embedded in  the ambient  intelligence structure and this  will pose other serious 
problems of legitimacy. In particular, choice as a normative principle will be put into question as 
this  kind  of  technology  changes  its  offers  as  a  reaction  to  the  person  with  which  is 
communicating. And this represents another strong reason to focus primarily on the production of 
code rather than on its outputs. 
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